David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 95 (April):224-9 (1986)
It has been argued that 'brain bisection' data leads us to abandon our traditional conception of personal identity. Nagel has remarked: The ultimate account of the unity of what we call a single mind consists of an enumeration of the types of functional integration that typify it. We know that these can be eroded in different ways and to different degrees. The belief that even in their complete version they can be explained by the presence of a numerically single subject is an i1lusion.l Parfit has adopted a similar position, contending that patients with 'split brains' become two separate 'streams of consciousness' and thus that our normal sense of personal identity, or at least 'what matters' about personal identity is constituted by psychological relations between connected conscious experiences2 It is claimed that in 'split brain' patients certain of the relations are disrupted and that we thus see clearly that the nature of the unity that is normally present does not reside in a single subject with a given identity, but in the connectedness and continuity that normally obtains. Parfit draws on two sources of support for these contentions: the first is the actual events that transpire after a human being is submitted to the operation of sectioning the corpus callosum (or 'brain bisection'), and the second is the imaginative consideration of various scenarios involving graded mental and physical discontinuity, and the 'fission' and 'fusion' of persons. I shall do little more than argue that the actual data will not sustain the interpretation put on them
|Keywords||Brain Personal Identity Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1973). Personal Identity. Milton Keynes: Open University Press,.
Michael B. Green & Daniel Wikler (2009). Brain Death and Personal Identity. In John P. Lizza (ed.), Philosophy and Public Affairs. Johns Hopkins University Press. 105 - 133.
John Perry (ed.) (1975). Personal Identity. University of California Press.
Lawrence H. Davis (2001). Functionalism, the Brain, and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-79.
Georg Northoff (2004). Am I My Brain? Personal Identity and Brain Identity - a Combined Philosophical and Psychological Investigation in Brain Implants. Philosophia Naturalis 41 (2):257-282.
Paul F. Snowdon (1991). Personal Identity and Brain Transplants. In David Cockburn (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 109-126.
John Thomas Wilke (1981). Personal Identity in the Light of Brain Physiology and Cognitive Psychology. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (3):323-334.
Roland Puccetti (1973). Brain Bisection and Personal Identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (April):339-55.
Jerome A. Shaffer (1977). Personal Identity: The Implications of Brain Bisection and Brain Transplants. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2 (June):147-61.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads91 ( #17,806 of 1,692,891 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #78,896 of 1,692,891 )
How can I increase my downloads?