Consciousness, thought, and neurological integrity
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (3):215-33 (1995)
The problematic features of the cognitive function of patients with brain damage are often taken to indicate that such persons have split or dual consciousness. An intentional or cognitive theory of consciousness which focuses on the structure and contents of conscious experience makes this thesis look quite unattractive. Consciousness is active and directed toward objects and in the human case it shows an internally reflective structure based on the abilities required to grasp and use concepts. On this view, consciousness is a way of referring to the active, integrative, conceptualizing activity of a human thinker in a world of other objects and persons. When we look at consciousness this way and re-examine, in the light of that analysis, the performance of split brain patients, one sees such persons as individuals afflicted with internal difficulties in their information processing capacities but neither as split consciousnesses nor as split minds
|Keywords||Cognition Consciousness Metaphysics Neural Neurobiology Science|
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