Defining 'dead' in terms of 'lives' and 'dies'

Philosophia 35 (2):219-231 (2007)
Abstract
What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. I show that Feldman’s own definition of ‘dead’ (in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies’) does not leave this possibility open. I propose a new definition that does.
Keywords Death  Dies  Dying  Dead  Life  Living  Alive  Lives  Suspended animation  Definition  Conceptual analysis  Feldman
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