David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 1 (1):65-84 (1997)
Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch a plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway.
|Keywords||collective action collective responsibility groups group action group intention group membership|
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Citations of this work BETA
Margaret Gilbert (2006). Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):94–114.
Deborah Tollefsen (2006). The Rationality of Collective Guilt. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):222–239.
Michael Mckenna (2006). Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):16–34.
Maura Priest (2013). Party Politics and Democratic Disagreement. Philosophia 42 (1):1-13.
Margaret Gilbert (2009). Pro Patria : An Essay on Patriotism. Journal of Ethics 13 (4):319 - 346.
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