Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):215 - 234 (2009)
Abstract
In the mid-20th century, descriptive meta-ethics addressed a number of central questions, such as whether there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, whether moral reasons are absolute or relative, and whether moral judgments express attitudes or describe states of affairs. I maintain that much of this work in mid-20th century meta-ethics proceeded on an assumption that there is good reason to question. The assumption was that our ordinary discourse is uniform and determinate enough to vindicate one side or the other of these meta-ethical debates. I suggest that ordinary moral discourse may be much less uniform and determinate than 20th century meta-ethics assumed
Keywords Meta-ethics  Internalism  Externalism  Michael Smith  R.M. Hare  David Brink
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    Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
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