In defense of the Popper-Miller argument

Philosophy of Science 53 (1):110-113 (1986)
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Abstract

In their 1983 article, Popper and Miller present an argument against inductive probability. This argument is criticized by Redhead in his 1985 article. The aim of the present note is to state one form of the Popper-Miller argument, and defend it against Redhead's criticisms

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Donald Gillies
University College London

References found in this work

On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.

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