Intersubjective probability and confirmation theory

This paper introduces what is called the intersubjective interpretation of the probability calculus. Intersubjective probabilities are related to subjective probabilities, and the paper begins with a particular formulation of the familiar Dutch Book argument. This argument is then extended, in Section 3, to social groups, and this enables the concept of intersubjective probability to be introduced in Section 4. It is then argued that the intersubjective interpretation is the appropriate one for the probabilities which appear in confirmation theory whether of a Bayesian or a Popperian variety. The final section of the paper states and tries to answer an objection due to Putnam
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/42.4.513
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Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Intersubjective Corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
Jochen Runde (1994). Keynes After Ramsey: In Defence of a Treatise on Probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.

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