British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):513-533 (1991)
|Abstract||This paper introduces what is called the intersubjective interpretation of the probability calculus. Intersubjective probabilities are related to subjective probabilities, and the paper begins with a particular formulation of the familiar Dutch Book argument. This argument is then extended, in Section 3, to social groups, and this enables the concept of intersubjective probability to be introduced in Section 4. It is then argued that the intersubjective interpretation is the appropriate one for the probabilities which appear in confirmation theory whether of a Bayesian or a Popperian variety. The final section of the paper states and tries to answer an objection due to Putnam|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
J. T. Ismael (2009). Probability in Deterministic Physics. Journal of Philosophy 106 (2):89-108.
Steven I. Miller & Marcel Fredericks (1991). A Case for "Qualitative Confirmation" for the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):452-467.
Simon Saunders (forthcoming). What is Probability? Arxiv Preprint Quant-Ph/0412194.
Patrick Maher (1996). Subjective and Objective Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall (2006). Probability. In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Intersubjective Corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #124,608 of 556,908 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,931 of 556,908 )
How can I increase my downloads?