Moral Impartialism and Moral Internalism

Abstract
A. Moral impartialism is a theory in normative ethics. Moral internalism is a theory in meta-ethics. One’s manner of twining normative ethics and meta-ethics varies according to his or her position on the relations of normative ethics and metaphysics, as to in what ways ethics needs analysis, or ontology, or metaphysics, if it needs any of these at all. This large question is the deeper background of this paper. Here I will show why impartialism and internalism both need each other and disturb each other when joined in a prescriptive moral philosophy. If the fundamental notions within internalism and impartialism are to be sustainable and complementary, then the forms of these two theories required for this result will greatly differ from the meta-ethical and metaphysical forms in which they are now commonly seen
Keywords impartialism  internalism  normative ethics  meta-ethucs
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