David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):727-738 (2011)
Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro (or P&S) have recently (2008) criticized ?causal-mechanist? views of realization that dominate research in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics of science. P&S offer the internal criticism that any account of realization focusing upon property instances, as views of causal-mechanist realization routinely do, must lead to incoherence about multiple realization. P&S's argument highlights important issues about property instances that have recently been neglected, as well as raising a challenge to the standard approach to understanding the non-causal relations between properties and their instances in the sciences. In response, I clarify some important background issues about property instances and their relations to properties which show why P&S's main argument fails. In addition, I provide a second reason to doubt their argument by highlighting reasons to think that instances, as well as properties, are plausibly sometimes multiply realized in the sciences
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
Carl Gillett (2002). The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View. Analysis 62 (4):316-323.
Carl Gillett (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
Carl Gillett (2007). Understanding the New Reductionism: The Metaphysics of Science and Compositional Reduction. Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):193-216.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ronald P. Endicott (2010). Realization, Reductios, and Category Inclusion. Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):213-219.
Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences. Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
Kenneth Aizawa (2013). Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
Ann Whittle (2003). The Causal Theory of Properties. Dissertation, UCL
Alexander Rueger (2004). Reduction, Autonomy, and Causal Exclusion Among Physical Properties. Synthese 139 (1):1 - 21.
Kevin Morris (2013). On Two Arguments for Subset Inheritance. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):197-211.
Sydney Shoemaker (2011). Realization, Powers and Property Identity. The Monist 94 (1):3-18.
Alexander Rueger (2004). Reduction, Autonomy, and Causal Exclusion Among Physical Properties. Synthese 139 (1):1-21.
Kevin Morris (2010). Guidelines for Theorizing About Realization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
Paul Audi (2012). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
Kevin Morris (2011). Subset Realization, Parthood, and Causal Overdetermination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):363-379.
Ronald P. Endicott (1994). Constructival Plasticity. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.
Graham Macdonald (2007). Emergence and Causal Powers. Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.
Thomas W. Polger (2007). Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Max Kistler (1999). Multiple Realization, Reduction and Mental Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):135 – 149.
Added to index2011-10-04
Total downloads69 ( #65,270 of 1,934,835 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #77,153 of 1,934,835 )
How can I increase my downloads?