Non-Bayesian Confirmation Theory, and the Principle of Explanatory Surplus

This paper suggests a new principle for confirmation theory which is called the principle of explanatory surplus. This principle is shown to be non-Bayesian in character, and to lead to a treatment of simplicity in science. Two cases of the principle of explanatory surplus are considered. The first (number of parameters) is illustrated by curve-fitting examples, while the second (number of theoretical assumptions) is illustrated by the examples of Newton's Laws and Adler's Theory of the Inferiority Complex.
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DOI 10.2307/192898
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Peter P. Kirschenmann (1991). Local and Normative Rationality of Science: The 'Content of Discovery' Rehabilitated. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (1):61-72.

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