Non-Bayesian Confirmation Theory, and the Principle of Explanatory Surplus

This paper suggests a new principle for confirmation theory which is called the principle of explanatory surplus. This principle is shown to be non-Bayesian in character, and to lead to a treatment of simplicity in science. Two cases of the principle of explanatory surplus are considered. The first (number of parameters) is illustrated by curve-fitting examples, while the second (number of theoretical assumptions) is illustrated by the examples of Newton's Laws and Adler's Theory of the Inferiority Complex.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Richard Otte (1994). A Solution to a Problem for Bayesian Confirmation Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):764-769.
    Donald Gillies (1991). A Bayesian Proof of a Humean Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):255-256.
    David E. Nelson (1996). Confirmation, Explanation, and Logical Strength. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):399-413.
    Crispin Wright (2001). Is Hume's Principle Analytic? In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), The Reason's Proper Study. Oxford University Press. 307-333.
    Barry Ward (2012). Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385.

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    2 ( #258,148 of 1,088,400 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,400 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.