On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity
Synthese 172 (1) (2010)
| Abstract | We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to delineate the scope of situations in which objective probabilities can be used. | |||||||||
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Matthew Weiner & Nuel Belnap (2006). How Causal Probabilities Might Fit Into Our Objectively Indeterministic World. Synthese 149 (1):1--36.
John L. Pollock (2002). Causal Probability. Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185.
David E. Buschena & David Zilberman (1999). Testing the Effects of Similarity on Risky Choice: Implications for Violations of Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 46 (3):253-280.
Robert N. Brandon (1978). Evolution. Philosophy of Science 45 (1):96-109.
J. Ellenberg & E. Sober (2011). Objective Probabilities in Number Theory. Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):308-322.
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