On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if )

Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349 (2009)
Abstract
What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and turn out to be equivalent. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?
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    Malte Willer (2011). Realizing What Might Be. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):365 - 375.
    Justin Khoo (2013). A Note on Gibbard's Proof. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):153-164.

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