Perception and neuroscience

Abstract
Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function in that form. This implies that the analysis of perception must consider not only the fact that there is an interaction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object but also that the interaction is shaped by a system of concepts which the subject uses in thought and action
Keywords Conception  Neuroscience  Perception  Science  Subjectivity
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Grant R. Gillett (1993). Social Causation and Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1):27–45.
Grant Gillett (1991). Language, Social Ecology and Experience. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):195 – 203.
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