In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Russellianism, roughly put, is the view that a sentence of the form ‘Ra1, . . ., an’ expresses a proposition that is composed of the universal expressed by the predicate in that sentence and the objects referred to by the names in the sentence. If ‘composed of’ is defined in terms of a parthood relation (rather than in terms of a constituency relation that is said not to be a parthood relation), the resulting version of Russellianism gives rise to a pair of mereological puzzles. (1) As Frege suggested, it generates counterexamples to the view that any parthood relation will be governed by a transitivity principle (or by some ‘adicity-appropriate analogue’ of such a principle, in case the parthood relation in question is not two-place). (2) It generates counterexamples to the view that any parthood relation will be governed by a certain ‘supplementation’ principle (or by an adicity-appropriate analogue of that principle). Elsewhere I have suggested on independent grounds that parthood might be a four-place relation (expressed by ‘x, at its location y, is a part of z, at its location w’). Here I argue that, on one natural way of spelling out Russellianism in terms of such a relation, it avoids both puzzles.|
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