David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cybernetics,” which he presented as en suite with six articles by several others on the same subject in the same journal during the preceding 18 months. This group of short papers, starting with one by Karl Popper, may be regarded as part of the first wave of response to Alan Turing’s famous paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” in 1950. Polanyi read Turing’s paper in draft and discussed it directly with Turing. The polemic as to whether machines can think and the mind’s likeness and unlikeness to a machine, has of course never ceased since then and, as Artificial Intelligence develops, is not likely to do so for many long decades. In addition to the traditional battle lines in philosophy over the mind and the brain there are other important lines of thought that disfavor logic as the final arbiter of the great philosophical questions—for example, feminist ontology and cultural theory. Polanyi started from within logic, but his line of thought was not built out of the old philosophical topics nor did he address the matter along either the materialist or the phenomenological developments of the twentieth century. He was concerned with the cybernetic view of the human mind and also with the way the followers of Wittgenstein regarded language and philosophy
|Keywords||Cybernetics Personalism Personal knowledge Turing Artificial intelligence Scientific method|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Richard Blum (2010). MICHAEL POLANYI: CAN THE MIND BE REPRESENTED BY A MACHINE? Polanyiana 19 (1-2):35-60.
Justin Leiber (2006). Turing's Golden: How Well Turing's Work Stands Today. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):13-46.
Peter Kugel (2002). Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...And Turing Said So). Minds and Machines 12 (4):563-579.
Susan G. Sterrett (2000). Turing's Two Tests for Intelligence. Minds and Machines 10 (4):541-559.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Alan Turing and the Mathematical Objection. Minds and Machines 13 (1):23-48.
Bruce Edmonds (2000). The Constructability of Artificial Intelligence (as Defined by the Turing Test). Journal of Logic Language and Information 9 (4):419-424.
Selmer Bringsjord (2000). Animals, Zombanimals, and the Total Turing Test: The Essence of Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Logic Language and Information 9 (4):397-418.
Ayse Pinar Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman (2000). Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot (2000). What Turing Did After He Invented the Universal Turing Machine. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):491-509.
Christian Beenfeldt (2006). The Turing Test: An Examination of its Nature and its Mentalistic Ontology. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 40:109-144.
Aaron Sloman (2002). The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to Artificial Intelligence. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
Saul Traiger (2000). Making the Right Identification in the Turing Test. Minds and Machines 10 (4):561-572.
Stanley L. Jaki (1969). Brain, Mind And Computers. Herder & Herder.
Ayse P. Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman (2000). Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
Added to index2011-08-12
Total downloads59 ( #26,602 of 1,102,731 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #61,837 of 1,102,731 )
How can I increase my downloads?