Philosophical Theories of Probability

Routledge (2000)
Abstract
This book presents a comprehensive and systematic account of the various philosophical theories of probability and explains how they are related. It covers the classical, logical, subjective, frequency, and propensity views of probability. Donald Gillies even provides a new theory of probability -the intersubjective-a development of the subjective theory. He argues for a pluralist view, where there can be more than one valid interpretation of probabiltiy, each appropriate in a different context. The relation of the various interpretations to the Bayesian controversy, which has become central in both statistics and philosophy of science, is explained as well.
Keywords Probabilities
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Call number BC141.G55 2000
ISBN(s) 9780415182751   0415182751
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Rachael Briggs (2010). The Metaphysics of Chance. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):938-952.

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