Philosophical Theories of Probability
Routledge (2000)
| Abstract | This book presents a comprehensive and systematic account of the various philosophical theories of probability and explains how they are related. It covers the classical, logical, subjective, frequency, and propensity views of probability. Donald Gillies even provides a new theory of probability -the intersubjective-a development of the subjective theory. He argues for a pluralist view, where there can be more than one valid interpretation of probabiltiy, each appropriate in a different context. The relation of the various interpretations to the Bayesian controversy, which has become central in both statistics and philosophy of science, is explained as well. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Probabilities | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $135.90 used (3% off) $140.00 new $140.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page | |||||||||
| Call number | BC141.G55 2000 | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 9780415182751 0415182751 | |||||||||
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Edward H. Allen (1976). Negative Probabilities and the Uses of Signed Probability Theory. Philosophy of Science 43 (1):53-70.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Jan Von Plato (1982). Probability and Determinism. Philosophy of Science 49 (1):51-66.
Simon Saunders (forthcoming). What is Probability? Arxiv Preprint Quant-Ph/0412194.
Richard C. Jeffrey (2004). Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge University Press.
John M. Vickers (1988). Chance and Structure: An Essay on the Logical Foundations of Probability. Oxford University Press.
Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Donald Gillies (1991). Intersubjective Probability and Confirmation Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):513-533.
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