David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 32 (September):261-77 (1989)
?Representation? is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ?the only game in town?. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories
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Grant R. Gillett (1993). Social Causation and Cognitive Neuroscience. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1):27–45.
J. van Brakel (1991). Meaning, Prototypes and the Future of Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-257.
J. Brakel (1991). Meaning, Prototypes and the Future of Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-257.
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