Rationality of belief or: why savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 187 (1):11-31 (2012)
Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. On the other hand, this notion of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs
|Keywords||Probability Rationality Beliefs Bayesian paradigm Savage axioms|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Leonard J. Savage (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Isaac Levi (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. The MIT Press.
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1960). The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Paterson, N.J.,Littlefield, Adams.
Richard C. Jeffrey (2004). Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa (2012). History as a Coordination Device. Theory and Decision 73 (4):501-512.
Dorian Jullien & Nicolas Vallois (2014). A Probabilistic Ghost in the Experimental Machine. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (3):232-250.
Andrea Polonioli (forthcoming). Adaptive Rationality, Biases, and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
Peter M. Todd & Henry Brighton (forthcoming). Building the Theory of Ecological Rationality. Minds and Machines:1-22.
Andrea Polonioli (2014). Evolution, Rationality, and Coherence Criteria. Biological Theory 9 (3):309-317.
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