Strong emergence as a defense of non-reductive physicalism: A physicalist metaphysics for 'downward' determination
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Principia 6 (1):89-120 (2002)
Iaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show tht the truth of Co? poses a very senous obstacle to realized properues beeng efficacrous in a physicalut =verse cmd sikwest that abandonmg Co? offers hope for defending non- reducuve physicalism
|Keywords||Causation Emergence Physicalism Reduction Science Kim, J|
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Citations of this work BETA
Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483-504.
Alexandre Guay & Olivier Sartenaer (2016). A New Look at Emergence. Or When After is Different. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):297-322.
Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives (2005). The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis. Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
Carl Gillett (2010). Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization: The Problem of Qualitative Distinctness in the Metaphysics of Science. Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
Warren Shrader (2010). Shoemaker on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):285 - 300.
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