Strong emergence as a defense of non-reductive physicalism: A physicalist metaphysics for 'downward' determination

Principia 6 (1):89-120 (2002)
Iaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challen,ge to both emergentism cmd ncm-reductIve physicalism lyy providing arguments that these positums are cornmitted to an untenabie combmation of both `upwarcit and 'clouniwardi determmation. In secuon 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realiza:0n relatzon underlies such sicepucal arguments However, tn secuon 2, I suggest that such conclusicrns involve a confusion between the implications of physicahsm and those of a related thesis the Vompleteness of Physics' (Co?) I show tht the truth of Co? poses a very senous obstacle to realized properues beeng efficacrous in a physicalut =verse cmd sikwest that abandonmg Co? offers hope for defending non- reducuve physicalism
Keywords Causation  Emergence  Physicalism  Reduction  Science  Kim, J
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Warren Shrader (2010). Shoemaker on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):285 - 300.
Tjeerd Van De Laar (2006). Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):307-332.

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