Shared intention and personal intentions

Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187 (2009)
Abstract
This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.
Keywords Agreements  Michael Bratman  Directed obligation  Joint commitment  Personal intentions  Plural subjects  Shared intention
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.

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Citations of this work BETA
Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Frank Hindriks (2013). Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):465-480.
Celia Brownell (2011). Early Developments in Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
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