Social rules: Some problems for Hart's account, and an alternative proposal
Law and Philosophy 18 (2):141-171 (1999)
| Abstract | What is a social rule? This paper first notes three important problems for H.L.A. Hart's famous answer in the Concept of Law. An alternative account that avoids the problems is then sketched. It is less individualistic than Hart's and related accounts. This alternative account can explain a phenomenon observed but downplayed by Hart: the parties to a social rule feel that they are in some sense 'bound' to conform to it. | |||||||||
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