Super-Hum(e)an Supervenience

Abstract
Argument that David Lewis's concept of supervenience does not support physicalism, from the viewpoint of an idealistic ontology. (Draft.) (2010)
Keywords David Lewis  physicalism  necessity  causality  Plato
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