Philosophical Studies 151 (2):177-197 (2010)
|Abstract||I defend coincidentalism (the view that some pluralities have more than one mereological fusion) and restricted composition (the view that some pluralities lack mereological fusions) against recent arguments due to Theodore Sider.|
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