The introspectibility thesis
Psyche 9 (5) (2003)
| Abstract | According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that Dainton's arguments fail, and, second, that joint introspectibility is actually insufficient for co-consciousness. (As to whether it is also unnecessary, I take no stance.). | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
 Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesUriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-Order Consciousness and Phenomenal Space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).
Keith Hossack (2002). Self-Knowledge and Consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.
Pete Mandik (2006). The Introspectibility of Brain States as Such. In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Greg Janzen (2006). Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
Norton Nelkin (1993). What is Consciousness? Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads27 ( #45,806 of 549,122 )Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #4,588 of 549,122 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
