The Kisceral: Reason and Intuition in Argumentation [Book Review]

Argumentation 25 (2):163-170 (2011)
Gilbert’s four modes of communication include the logical, the emotional, the visceral and the kisceral, which last has not received much attention at all. This mode covers the forms of argument that rely on intuition and undefended basal assumptions. These forms range from the scientific and mathematical to the religious and mystical. In this paper these forms will be examined, and suggestions made for ways in which intuitive frameworks can be compared and valued
Keywords Kisceral  Intuition  Multi-modal argument  Conceptual frameworks
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DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9210-2
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen E. Toulmin (2003). The Uses of Argument. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).

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Michael A. Gilbert (1994). Multi-Modal Argumentation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (2):159-177.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.

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