David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy East and West 43 (2):175-200 (1993)
The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of personal identity, and by approaching the problem in terms of phenomenology, Buddhist psychology, and the idea of a constructed self-image.
|Keywords||No-self theory personal identity Hume Buddhism phenomenology|
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James Giles (1994). A Theory of Love and Sexual Desire. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):339–357.
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