Varieties of propensity

Abstract
The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case propensity theories, one due to Miller and the later Popper, and the other to Fetzer. The three approaches are compared by examining how they deal with a key problem for the propensity approach, namely the relationship between propensity and causality and Humphreys' paradox.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/51.4.807
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Mauricio Suárez (2007). Quantum Propensities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):418-438.
Mauricio Suárez (2007). Quantum Propensities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):418-438.

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