Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):207-231 (1999)
|Abstract||The running debate between Peter Achinstein and his critics concerning the nature of scientific evidence is misguided as each side attempts to explicate a distinct notion of evidence. Achinstein's approach, however, is valuable in helping to point out a problem with Carnap's statistical relevance model. By claiming an increase in probability to be necessary for evidence, the received view is incapable of accounting for evidence which is statistically irrelevant but explanatorily relevant. A broader view of evidence which can account for pragmatic concerns such as explanation is thereby required.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Branden Fitelson & Richard Feldman (2012). Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
Maya J. Goldenberg (2009). Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism, and the Hierarchy of Evidence. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (2):168-187.
Lynn Hankinson Nelson (1993). A Question of Evidence. Hypatia 8 (2):172 - 189.
Steven Gimbel (2004). Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
Frederick M. Kronz (1992). Carnap and Achinstein on Evidence. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):151 - 167.
Sherrilyn Roush (2004). Discussion Note: Positive Relevance Defended. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):110-116.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #122,437 of 739,319 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,319 )
How can I increase my downloads?