Aesthetic judging and the intentionality of pleasure

Inquiry 46 (2):164 – 181 (2003)
Abstract
I point out some unclarities in Allison's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory, specifically in his account of the free play of the faculties. I argue that there is a tension between Allison's commitment to the intentionality of the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty, and his view that the pleasure is distinct from the judgment, and I claim that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the latter view. I conclude by addressing Allison's objection that my own view fails to accommodate judgments of non-beauty or ugliness.
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DOI 10.1080/00201740310001173
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