In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations

Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237 (2008)
Abstract
This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Keywords Explanation of action  Intentional action  Non-causal explanation  Reasons for acting
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,074
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.

View all 7 references

Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27--35.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

63 ( #23,730 of 1,101,578 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #35,036 of 1,101,578 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.