In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations

Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237 (2008)
This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Keywords Explanation of action  Intentional action  Non-causal explanation  Reasons for acting
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References found in this work BETA
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.

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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27--35.
Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.

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