Graduate studies at Western
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146 (2012)
|Abstract||I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying the primitively normative attitudes speakers must adopt towards their uses if they are to use the expression with understanding|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel Whiting (2009). On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.
Anthony Dardis (1994). How the Radically Interpreted Make Mistakes. Dialogue 33 (03):415-.
Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism About Meaning. In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
John Fennell (2013). “The Meaning of 'Meaning is Normative' ”. Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):56-78.
Adolf Rami (2005). Über Die Sogenannte Normativität der Bedeutung. Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):81-117.
Adrian Haddock (2012). Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
Daniel Whiting (2007). The Normativity of Meaning Defended. Analysis 67 (294):133–140.
Hannah Ginsborg (2011). Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules. Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
Anandi Hattiangadi (2006). Is Meaning Normative? Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
Allan Gibbard (1994). Meaning and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2012). Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
Martin Montminy (2005). Meaning Skepticism and Normativity. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
Added to index2012-05-16
Total downloads105 ( #7,164 of 739,080 )
Recent downloads (6 months)41 ( #2,126 of 739,080 )
How can I increase my downloads?