Meaning, Understanding and Normativity

I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying the primitively normative attitudes speakers must adopt towards their uses if they are to use the expression with understanding
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00211.x
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PhilPapers Archive Hannah Ginsborg, Meaning, Understanding and Normativity
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
H. P. Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.

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Citations of this work BETA
Adrian Haddock (2012). Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
Ulf Hlobil (2015). Anti-Normativism Evaluated. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):376-395.
Claudine Verheggen (2015). Towards a New Kind of Semantic Normativity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):410-424.
Matthew Jones (2015). The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):425-443.

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