Review of Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content, by Anandi Hattiangadi
Mind 119 (476):1175-1186 (2011)
| Abstract | Anandi Hattiangadi packs a lot of argument into this lucid, well-informed and lively examination of the meaning scepticism which Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein. Her verdict on the success of the sceptical considerations is mixed. She concludes that they are sufficient to rule out all accounts of meaning and mental content proposed so far. But she believes that they fail to constitute, as Kripke supposed they did, a fully general argument against the possibility of meaning or content. Even though we are not now in a position to specify facts in which meaning consists, the view that there are such facts, and more specifically that they satisfy the intuitive conception of meaning which she labels ‘semantic realism’, remains a live option. Moreover, given.. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesAnandi Hattiangadi (2007). Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content. Oxford University Press.
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