Two kinds of mechanical inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle

Abstract
I distinguish two senses in which organisms are mechanically inexplicable for Kant. Mechanical inexplicability in the first sense is shared with artefacts, and consists in their exhibiting regularities irreducible to the regularities of matter. Mechanical inexplicability in the second sense is peculiar to organisms, consisting in the reciprocal causal dependence of an organism's parts. This distinction corresponds to two strands of thought in Aristotle, one supporting a teleological conception of organisms, the other supporting a conception of organisms as natural. Recognizing this distinction helps us to see how a teleological conception of organisms is compatible with recent advances in biology.
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Citations of this work BETA
Marcel Quarfood (2006). Kant on Biological Teleology: Towards a Two-Level Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (4):735-747.
Andrew Janiak (2004). Kant as Philosopher of Science. Perspectives on Science 12 (3):339-363.
D. M. Walsh (2006). Organisms as Natural Purposes: The Contemporary Evolutionary Perspective. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (4):771-791.
John H. Zammito (2012). The Lenoir Thesis Revisited: Blumenbach and Kant. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):120-132.

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