Was Kant a nonconceptualist?

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77 (2008)
I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought and judgment.
Keywords Kant  Perception  Nonconceptual content  Intentionality  Normativity
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DOI 10.2307/40208780
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and Nonconceptual Content. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.

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Citations of this work BETA
Clinton Tolley (2012). Kant on the Content of Cognition. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.

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