Aristotelian and Naturalistic Ontology

In A. Corradini, S. Galvan & E. J. Lowe (eds.), Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism. Routledge (2006)
Abstract
The present paper analyses the correctness of an argument aiming to show that Aristotelian ontology justifies a better interpretation of the world than naturalistic ontology. The problems connected with this argument can be reduced to three: (1) the assumption of a scientific appoach to the world does not imply the exclusion of subjectivity or intentionality; (2) the assumption of an ontology of substances does not imlpy the exclusion of ontological models deriving from the scientific approach to the world; (3) the assumption of an ontology of substances is linked to the problem of the relation between the objective and the subjective world, involving the negation of causal closure of the objective world. An analysis of these problems will be presented below, together with a hypothesis of solution to the problem of illusoriness of the subjective dimension, in order to justify the confutation of an extreme naturalistic conception such as eliminativism.
Keywords Aristotelian ontology  naturalistic ontology  first person perspective  third person perspective
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