Trust as the End of Practical Reason. Justification Procedures

In Botturi Francesco (ed.), Understanding Human Experience. Peter Lang (2012)
Abstract
This paper is about the epistemology of practical reason and, in particular, the function of trust as an end to be pursued rationally in praxis. Our purpose is threefold: first, to present an outline of the structure of practical reason; secondly, to compare practical reason and scientific reason in order to determine the main differences between these two basic manifestations of human reason; finally, to argue in favour of a non-utilitarian model of practical reason in the light of some results of contemporary economic theory.
Keywords trust  consequentialism  practical reason
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