Mental disorder and intentional order

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):117-121 (2006)
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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mental Disorder and Intentional OrderRichard Gipps (bio)Bengt Brülde and Filip Radovic inform the reader that they will assume "there is such a thing as a general category of disorder, of which mental and somatic disorders can be regarded as subcategories" (2006, 100). With this assumption in place, they take up a fascinating discussion of what warrants our categorizations of certain disorders as mental as opposed to physical. The answers they then canvass include the possibilities that it is the mentality of the internal causes, or of the symptomatic effects, of these disorders which renders them mental, or that there is no single answer, or that there is no valid distinction to be drawn.In what follows I wish to question the initial assumption, and then offer an understanding of the nature of mentality that I hope will lead to a different way of answering the question, what is mental about mental disorder? It worries me that the views I develop here may share too little by way of common framework assumptions with the views developed in Brülde and Radovic's paper. I hope that this does not render dialogue impossible, or make the thoughts that were inspired by their thoughtful paper appear just too off field to be seriously entertained.The Concept of DisorderBrülde and Radovic assume that "mental disorders" and "physical disorders" are subtypes of a general category of disorder. (In what follows I describe this as the assumption.) They also distinguish between two questions: (1) What is mental about mental disorder? (in what follows I describe this as the question) and (2) What does it take for a condition to be a disorder? This latter question is, they acknowledge, certainly important, but is set aside for the time being.Mental disorder, physical disorder, and we might perhaps also add social disorder, are then subcategories of disorder. They are perhaps not natural kinds, but nevertheless they are subcategories within a general category. With their assumption in place it makes good sense to reject accounts of the mentality of mental disorders that seem to simply presuppose the concepts of mind and body when they address the question.There is of course a trivial sense in which everyone must agree that mental disorders and physical disorders are to be considered subcategories of disorder. There is what could be described as a logical sense of category and subcategory, in which any noun is said to designate a category and any adjectival qualification of it to introduce a subcategory. However, we can also distinguish what I call a "semantic" sense, in which talk of categories and subcategories is more restricted. Here we rely on there being a unitary sense to the putative category if we are to talk meaningfully of subcategories of this single category. [End Page 117]The philosophy of the individuation of senses is not within my expertise, but I am relying on an intuitive notion spelled out by the following. First, that a good dictionary would elaborate these senses by providing different definitions of the putative category rather than a single definition followed by examples. Second, that when we do not have to do with categories in the semantic sense, we would find ourselves more in want of true understanding of what was being said, and not so much in want of mere further knowledge, if we are offered a description that included the noun (disorder) without the qualifier (mental). Third, that we are less likely to be dealing with subcategories within a general semantic category if we easily can turn the adjective–noun pair (e.g., mental disorder) around to provide two nouns in a short phrase (e.g., disorder of the mind), or if there are verbal and adjectival forms of the second noun that can also be used in conjunction with the first noun (e.g., disordered mind).An example serves to make things clearer. Consider a chemist who has a reaction in her laboratory. What is referred to may be an emotional reaction (to her sudden scientific breakthrough), or a chemical reaction. In this case, I suggest, we do not have to do with a semantic category of "reaction," which...

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Richard Gipps
Oxford University

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