Morals, Beliefs, and Counterfactuals

Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):337-338 (2010)
Abstract
We have found that moral considerations interact with belief ascription in determining intentionality judgment. We attribute this finding to a differential availability of plausible counterfactual alternatives that undo the negative side-effect of an action. We conclude that Knobe's thesis does not account for processes by which counterfactuals are generated and how these processes affect moral evaluations.
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