David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 50 (02):281-306 (2011)
In this paper, I distinguish between two families of theories which view moral norms as either “inputs” or “outputs.” I argue that the most plausible version of each model can ultimately be seen as the two sides of the same model, which I call Moderate Nativism. The difference between these two apparently antagonistic models is one of perspective rather than content: while the Input model explains how emotional dispositions constrain the historical evolution of moral norms, the Output model explains how these same dispositions naturally give rise to corresponding moral judgments in individuals.
|Keywords||Origin of morality Origin of moral norms Nativism Genealogy Evolution of morality Dispositions to morality Moral universality Moral principles Moral intuitions|
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References found in this work BETA
Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
Marc Hauser (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. Harper Collins.
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
Shaun Nichols (2004). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford University Press.
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