Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||We show that for solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal game form does not provide information on how to carry out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game does. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through a solution concept which we call guided iteratively elimination of dominated strategies which requires a uniform order of elimination. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Antonio Quesada (2001). The Normal Form is Not Sufficient. Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):235-243.
Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
Prakash P. Shenoy (1998). Game Trees For Decision Analysis. Theory and Decision 44 (2):149-171.
Oliver Schulte (1996). Common Reasoning About Admissibility. Erkenntnis 45 (2/3):299 - 325.
Cristina Bicchieri & Oliver Schulte (1996). Common Reasoning About Admissibility. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):299 - 325.
Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
Giacomo Bonanno (1992). Players' Information in Extensive Games. Mathematical Social Sciences 24 (1):35-48.
Marion Scheepers (1993). Variations on a Game of Gale (I): Coding Strategies. Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (3):1035-1043.
Reinhard Selten (1998). Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames. Theory and Decision 44 (1):1-36.
Giacomo Bonanno (2004). Memory and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games. Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2):237-256.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-12-22
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?