Free will has a neural substrate: Critique of Joseph F. Rychlak's discovering free will and personal responsibility

Zygon 18 (1):67-82 (1983)
Abstract
. Ably marshalling ideas from theology, philosophy, and neurology, personality theorist Joseph F. Rychlak criticizes mechanistic psychologists' neglect of will and responsibility; these human qualities involve dialectically considering alternatives. I disagree with Rychlaks suggestion of fundamental mystery in the minds transcendence of the body and believe transcendent mind is intimately related to biological evolution and the brain. For example, dialectics, seen in simpler forms in lower animals, may require neural inhibition, feedback circuits, and topographic mappings. However, epistemologically speaking, neuroscientists strongly need the human insights of work such as Rychlak's to understand the alternatives, in planning investigation at more microscopic levels
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Joseph F. Rychlak (1980). Concepts of Free Will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 1:9-32.
Tamler Sommers (2007). The Illusion of Freedom Evolves. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual volition and social context. MIT Press 61.
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