Hume on the Cartesian Theory of Substance

Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):497-508 (1984)
While most of hume's criticisms of the doctrine of substance are epistemological and theory-Independent, We show that in "treatise" i.Iv.5, Hume develops a metaphysical criticism of the cartesian theory of substance. Using three of pierre bayle's arguments of his own ends, He argues that on an empiricist theory of meaning, The cartesian theory of substance is reduced to absurdity
Keywords Hume
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1984.tb00365.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jiri Benovsky (2009). The Self : A Humean Bundle and/or a Cartesian Substance ? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.
Christina Van Dyke (2009). Not Properly a Person. Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.
John Earman (1993). Bayes, Hume, and Miracles. Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):293-310.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
E. J. Lowe (2009). Substance Dualism : A Non-Cartesian Approach. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

11 ( #212,801 of 1,724,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #134,547 of 1,724,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.