Minimalism, deﬂationism, and paradoxes
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper argues against a broad category of deﬂationist theories of truth. It does so by asking two seemingly unrelated questions. The ﬁrst is about the well-known logical and semantic paradoxes: Why is there no strengthened version of Russell’s paradox, as there is a strengthened version of the Liar paradox? Oddly, this question is rarely asked. It does have a fairly standard answer, which I shall not dispute for purposes of this paper. But I shall argue that asking it ultimately leads to a fundamental challenge to some popular versions of deﬂationism.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Hartry Field (2007). Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Peter Eldridge-Smith (2007). Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel. In Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul Campbell & Peter Wylie (eds.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing.
Emil Badici (2008). The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.
J. C. Beall (ed.) (2003). Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2000). The Principle of Uniform Solution (of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference). Mind 109 (433):117-122.
Jeff Snapper (2012). The Liar Paradox in New Clothes. Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
Joachim Bromand (2002). Why Paraconsistent Logic Can Only Tell Half the Truth. Mind 111 (444):741-749.
Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason (2011). Paradoxes of Intensionality. The Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
Michael Glanzberg (2003). Minimalism and Paradoxes. Synthese 135 (1):13 - 36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #74,544 of 739,305 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?