Recovery recovered

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):171-206 (2000)
Abstract
The most controversial condition that the AGM theory of rational belief change places on belief contraction is the recovery condition. The condition is controversial because of a series of putative counterexamples due (separately) to I. Levi and S. O. Hansson. In this paper we show that the conflicts that Levi and Hansson arrange between AGM contraction and our intuitions about how to give up beliefs are merely apparent. We argue that these conflicts disappear once we attend more closely to the identification of the beliefs contracted away in each counterexample case. Since, on our view, speakers" belief contraction intentions are often more complicated than they may first appear, we are led to develop apparatus for thinking about the communication and identification of those intentions. Our argument refocuses attention on the difficult question of how to apply the AGM theory to particular cases.
Keywords AGM  belief revision  belief contraction  recovery  logic of theory change
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References found in this work BETA
André Fuhrmann (1991). Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.
André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson (1994). A Survey of Multiple Contractions. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Ove Hansson (2013). Blockage Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):415-442.
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