Recovery recovered

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):171-206 (2000)
The most controversial condition that the AGM theory of rational belief change places on belief contraction is the recovery condition. The condition is controversial because of a series of putative counterexamples due (separately) to I. Levi and S. O. Hansson. In this paper we show that the conflicts that Levi and Hansson arrange between AGM contraction and our intuitions about how to give up beliefs are merely apparent. We argue that these conflicts disappear once we attend more closely to the identification of the beliefs contracted away in each counterexample case. Since, on our view, speakers" belief contraction intentions are often more complicated than they may first appear, we are led to develop apparatus for thinking about the communication and identification of those intentions. Our argument refocuses attention on the difficult question of how to apply the AGM theory to particular cases.
Keywords AGM  belief revision  belief contraction  recovery  logic of theory change
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004781319263
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References found in this work BETA
Adam Grove (1988). Two Modellings for Theory Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Ove Hansson (2013). Blockage Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):415-442.

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