Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):171-206 (2000)
|Abstract||The most controversial condition that the AGM theory of rational belief change places on belief contraction is the recovery condition. The condition is controversial because of a series of putative counterexamples due (separately) to I. Levi and S. O. Hansson. In this paper we show that the conflicts that Levi and Hansson arrange between AGM contraction and our intuitions about how to give up beliefs are merely apparent. We argue that these conflicts disappear once we attend more closely to the identification of the beliefs contracted away in each counterexample case. Since, on our view, speakers" belief contraction intentions are often more complicated than they may first appear, we are led to develop apparatus for thinking about the communication and identification of those intentions. Our argument refocuses attention on the difficult question of how to apply the AGM theory to particular cases.|
|Keywords||AGM belief revision belief contraction recovery logic of theory change|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Meyer & Ka-Shu Wong (2008). Iterated Belief Change and the Recovery Axiom. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):501 - 520.
Isaac Levi (2003). Counterexamples to Recovery and the Filtering Condition. Studia Logica 73 (2):209 - 218.
Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer.
Eduardo Fermé, Karina Saez & Pablo Sanz (2003). Multiple Kernel Contraction. Studia Logica 73 (2):183 - 195.
Eduardo L. Fermé (1998). On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction Without Recovery. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):127-137.
Sven Ove Hansson (1999). Recovery and Epistemic Residue. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):421-428.
Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan (2008). Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents. Synthese 165 (2):159-177.
Thomas Meyer, Johannes Heidema, Willem Labuschagne & Louise Leenen (2002). Systematic Withdrawal. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (5):415-443.
John Cantwell (2003). Eligible Contraction. Studia Logica 73 (2):167 - 182.
Sven Ove Hansson (1991). Belief Contraction Without Recovery. Studia Logica 50 (2):251 - 260.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads1 ( #291,948 of 729,710 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?