Semantics and Truth Relative to a World

Synthese 166 (2):281 - 307 (2009)
Abstract
This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails
Keywords Semantics  Semantic value  Intensional logic  Content  Possible worlds  Relativism
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References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (1994). Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Collins (2014). Cutting It (Too) Fine. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):143-172.
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