Semantics and Truth Relative to a World

Synthese 166 (2):281 - 307 (2009)
This paper argues that relativity of truth to a world plays no significant role in empirical semantic theory, even as it is done in the model-theoretic tradition relying on intensional type theory. Some philosophical views of content provide an important notion of truth at a world, but they do not constrain the empirical domain of semantic theory in a way that makes this notion empirically significant. As an application of this conclusion, this paper shows that a potential motivation for relativism based on the relativity of truth to a world fails
Keywords Semantics  Semantic value  Intensional logic  Content  Possible worlds  Relativism
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DOI 10.2307/40271143
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Max Kölbel (2015). Relativism 2: Semantic Content. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
Juhani Yli‐Vakkuri (2013). Propositions and Compositionality. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):526-563.

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