Against Belief Normativity

In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press (2013)
We have argued against the thesis that content is essentially normative (Glüer & Wikforss 2009). In the course of doing so, we also presented some considerations against the thesis that belief is essentially normative. In this paper we clarify and develop these considerations, thereby paving the road for a fully non-normative account of the nature of belief.
Keywords belief  truth norm  rule guidance  rationality  reasons
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Teemu Toppinen (2015). Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.

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