In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
|Abstract||We have argued against the thesis that content is essentially normative (Glüer & Wikforss 2009). In the course of doing so, we also presented some considerations against the thesis that belief is essentially normative. In this paper we clarify and develop these considerations, thereby paving the road for a fully non-normative account of the nature of belief.|
|Keywords||belief truth norm rule guidance rationality reasons|
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