David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 202 (2009)
Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior to and independently of any particular theoretical position regarding names, and then resolving that puzzle with his theory of Sinn and Bedeutung. In this paper, I suggest that Frege’s presentation is problematic. If attempt is made to characterize the epistemic status of true identity sentences without appeal to Frege’s theoretical commitments, then what initially seemed puzzling largely dissolves. It turns out that, in order to generate puzzlement, Frege must invoke the theoretical account that he uses the puzzle to establish the purported necessity of.
|Keywords||Frege's Puzzle Logical Form Descriptive Theories of Names|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert May (2012). What Frege's Theory of Identity is Not. Thought 1 (1):41-48.
Michael Dummett (1976). I. Frege as a Realist. Inquiry 19 (1-4):455-468.
John Justice (2002). Mill-Frege Compatibalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:567-576.
Joseph Almog (2008). Frege Puzzles? Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):549 - 574.
Dirk Greimann (2008). Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner. Mind 117 (466):403-425.
Tim Crane (1992). Names, Sense and Kripke’s Puzzle. From the Logical Point of View 2:11-26.
Gideon Makin (2010). Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
Dale Jacquette (2011). Frege on Identity as a Relation of Names. Metaphysica 12 (1):51-72.
M. A. Moffett (2002). A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle. Journal of Semantics 19 (2):159-166.
Added to index2009-09-15
Total downloads110 ( #12,150 of 1,410,464 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #14,155 of 1,410,464 )
How can I increase my downloads?