The Propositions We Assert

Acta Analytica 26 (2):165-173 (2011)
Abstract
According to Scott Soames, proper names have no descriptive meaning. Nonetheless, Soames maintains that proper names are typically used to make descriptive assertions. In this paper, I challenge Soames’ division between meaning and what is asserted, first by arguing that competent speakers always make descriptive assertions with name-containing sentences, and then by defending an account of proper name meaning that accommodates this fact
Keywords Proper names  Descriptions  Assertion  Propositions  Meaning
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References found in this work BETA
David Braun (2006). Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
S. Soames (2006). Reply to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):711 - 738.
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