Abilities and Know-How Attributions

In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays on Knowledge Ascriptions. OUP (forthcoming)
Abstract
Anti-Intellectualists about know-how , following Ryle, hold that knowing how to do something is simply having the ability to do it. With qualifications, I defend this traditional view. The central motivation is drawn from observations about what is involved in learning to do something. Two sorts of ability are distinguished and the thesis is defended against putative counterexamples.
Keywords knowledge how  ability  language
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