Ii. the rationality principle and action explanations: Koertge's reconstruction of Popper's logic of action explanations
Inquiry 20 (1-4):72 – 81 (1977)
|Abstract||Reconstructing Popper's research programme for the Human Sciences, Noretta Koertge (Inquiry , Vol. 18 ) has given a deductive-nomological account of explanations of actions by means of a Rationality Principle. It is argued here that such a Rationality Principle is fundamentally redundant. Neither is it logically necessary in order to deduce a cognitive action-explanandum, nor can it be given a semantic non-empty interpretation, at least not within Koertge's own syllogism. Any attempt to save the Rationality Principle as unfalsifiablc but nevertheless indispensable for action explanations is rejected in the light of possible alternative action explanations by empirical and therefore in principle falsifiable psychological laws.|
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